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Statistical summary, Week 16:

* Total Fighter Command Establishment: 1727 planes
* Strength: 1735 planes
* Balance: over strength 8 planes
* Weekly Aircraft Production: 9 Beaufighters, 16 Defiants, 69 Hurricanes, 42 Spitfires

The fact that the RAF had emerged apparently intact from nearly 4 months of day to day battle against a concerted attack by three Luftflotten of the Luftwaffe was of enormous significance. Against every expectation, to have won this victory meant that the rest of the world saw that Britain was a serious contender in the war against Hitler. The country was, after all, the only one in Europe still at war with Hitler. It meant that the many governments who had already sought refuge in London knew now that they were safe here. They wouldn’t have to move again in a hurry. From Churchill’s point of view it meant above all that he could show America that Britain was worth supporting.

For Britain itself, the victory meant that the Germans would not, after all, be marching down Whitehall in a repetition of their victory parade down the Champs Elysees. It meant also, that Britain would not have to experience the nightmare of invasion with the Gestapo making lists of thousands of English people whom they wanted to eliminate. We were to face some appalling dangers in the rest of the war and it would be over two years before we would be able to celebrate a victory on land against German forces. Indeed, we would be in for five years of strife. But we had won our spurs and had not been defeated right at the start, as we might well have been. Our deliverance was, in fact, due to two circumstances. First, the preparation which we had put in before the war so that we were in a position to defend ourselves. Secondly, the small band of young fighter pilots who threw themselves into the fight with such determination. As might have been remarked at the time, it had been a good show.

In effect, the issue over which the Battle had been fought had been decided back in September, during the battles over London on September 15th and September 27th. As October began, the Germans withdrew their twin-engined bombers from daylight operations over Britain. The Do17, the He111 and the Ju87 Stuka dive bomber were no longer to be seen in the skies of this country. It was the same with the invasion fleet and the barges in the French ports which were already being withdrawn. The threat of the invasion, Sealion, was over.

The fact was the RAF had thwarted the Luftwaffe in its effort to wipe out Fighter Command. The RAF had not ceded control over British airspace to the enemy. The German order had been quite clear. It had been to defeat Fighter Command so that the Spitfires and Hurricanes would no longer contest a German invasion. The German pilots understood quite clearly what they had failed to achieve. That ace pilot, Galland, had no doubt about what had happened. There had been a muddle and they had paid for it. Tactically, it was the switch from attacking Fighter Command’s airfields to the whole force attacking London which was their big mistake. We shall never know, had they not made the switch, whether their persistent attacks on Fighter Command airfields might not have forced Dowding to withdraw his forces to airfields in the Midlands. As it was the Germans lost the chance to find out.

It had been a very close run thing. The RAF hadn’t defeated the Luftwaffe and Britain was very far from knocking Germany out of the war. But what the RAF had done was to thwart German intentions. To that extent, it was a great victory.

Statistical summary, Week 15:

* Total Fighter Command Establishment: 1700 planes
* Strength: 1737 planes
* Balance: over strength 37 planes
* Weekly Aircraft Production: 6 Beaufighters, 8 Defiants, 55 Hurricanes, 25 Spitfires

Training the Aces

Derby winners are the product of trainers. So are successful fighter pilots. All pilots who fly in war or peace are the product of instructors who have taught them to fly. The RAF, at the time of the Battle of Britain and now, pays a great deal of attention to the training of their air crew. Pre-war training of pilots tended to take place at a somewhat leisurely pace. Directly the country went to war, there was a speeding up of the process. Anybody interested in finding out what it was like could do no better than to read Geoffrey Wellum’s book, “First Light”, in which he describes his experience of joining the RAF just before war broke out in September 1939 and the conclusion of his training when he joined 92 squadron flying Spitfires in May 1940.

There were two parts in the process of training: flying training and the intellectual task of learning what flying was about. You had to pass both to qualify.

The flying took the form of three stages. The first was the gentle art of learning to fly a really simple training plane. In 1939 it was the De Havilland Tiger Moth, a very light two-seater bi-plane. This is the aircraft in which the trainee pilot first got his experience of going solo which usually occurred after doing some 7 or 8 hours of instruction.

The next stage was, in those days, when the pilot graduated onto the Harvard. This was an American built and designed two-seater trainer which was a monoplane with a good deal more powerful engine than that of the Moth. It had some of the characteristics of a fully fledged fighter aircraft. In it the trainee pilot was moved from the simple aerodynamics of the Tiger Moth to the more demanding performance resembling that of a Hurricane or Spitfire.

Then came the third and most demanding stage of the training when the trainee was subject to the real test, both of skill and nerve of flying a real fighter, which in those days meant the Spitfire. This last stage was when the trainee really had to learn his stuff.

It was at this stage that the relationship between the instructor and his pupil became really crucial. Wellum’s description of his instructor tells the story. When Wellum, the newly commissioned trainee, met his instructor for the first time, he addressed him as “Sir”. The answer came back, “You don’t call me, “Sir”, Sir. You call me Flight Sergeant or Flight”. What this hardened instructor, in his late twenties, with sharp bright blue eyes and thin lips wanted was perfection. He was a hard task master and kept Wellum at it until he was satisfied. But he was probably responsible for Wellum’s survival when it came to the Battle that summer. The skills he had taught Wellum lasted him, not only through the Battle, but for two long years afterwards until Wellum came home from Malta at the end of his third tour. He owed his life to that instructor.

Throughout the Battle the RAF turned out pilots at an increasing rate to fill the gaps caused by operations, on the squadrons. The service never ran short of pilots, but there was undoubtedly a diminution in the performance of the newly qualified pilots as a result of the time pressure Training Command was under to get them onto the front line. It meant that the squadrons were having to rely on younger and less experienced pilots than they had started with. It was inevitable but regrettable.

Dowding had been teetering on the edge of enforced retirement for more than a year. He was now 58 years old. He had never been popular in the upper reaches of the Service. Ever since his appointment as AOC in C of Fighter Command, on that Command’s creation in the summer of 1936, he had fought tooth and nail to get what he thought he needed for his command. He tended to ignore the fact that other commands in the RAF also had needs which required attention. He had been in line for the ultimate post for Chief of the Air Staff, that is Head of the Air Force, but he was passed over. He took that reasonably well. He was, after all, totally committed to the task of preparing Fighter Command for battle.

He was told he was going to have to retire shortly before the war began but when it did begin and there being no candidate to replace him being immediately available, he was asked to stay. The date of his retirement was moved forwards. It happened twice more until the date of his retirement was fixed for November 1940.

Coincidentally, the tactics followed during the Battle and, in particular, the question of the Big Wing, became the subject of a major meeting at the Air Ministry which was called for 17th October. The conference was to be chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff. Dowding and Park were duly called. When they got to the Air Ministry, the meeting turned out to be taken by Air Vice Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, the Deputy to the Chief of the Air Staff who was unavoidably away. Also attending was Air Vice Marshall Leigh Mallory. He turned up with Douglas Bader in tow. It was Bader who was to steal the show.

Dowding had been given no indication of what the meeting was to be about. In particular, he had not been warned that Bader would be there. Otherwise he might have brought one of at least a dozen fighter pilots from 11 Group.

When the meeting got under way, Leigh Mallory soon introduced Bader. He was the only person in the room who had been flying in the Battle. He spoke with enormous energy and enthusiasm about the question of tactics and in particular his take on them. It was clear that the Big Wing thesis was to win the day. And it did.

When Dowding and Park left, Park wanted to ensure that the other side of the argument was incorporated into the minute which would undoubtedly be written. So he went straight back to Uxbridge to write it. When he sent his draft into the Air Ministry, the notion of incorporating it into the minute of the meeting was duly rejected.

The upshot was that Dowding was retired. Park was removed from his post and sent to command a Group in Training Command. The Air Ministry produced a slim pamphlet giving an account of the Battle which failed to mention Dowding or, indeed, Park. Churchill remarked that it was like an account of Trafalgar without any mention of Nelson.

Air Vice Marshal Sholto Douglas then took over the command of Fighter Command. Trafford Leigh Mallory took over from Park at 11 Group. Bader was to get further promotion to Wing Commander and took over command of a wing at Tangmere.

Thus ended the drama of the Battle of Britain. It was not a particularly happy ending. The majority view in the command amongst the pilots was that Dowding and Park had been shuffled out of their positions, mainly as a result of politics. There is no doubt about the fact that the Battle had been the most important in British history since Trafalgar and Waterloo. Dowding’s reputation has survived his dislodgement from office and his standing now compares with that of Admiral Nelson. He was one of those very few Englishmen to win a military contest on which the future of the country depended, decisively. Park is now emerging as Dowding’s main instrument in the victory achieved that year.

Dowding was a hugely successful commander except in one respect. He allowed a disagreement between two key subordinates, Keith Park and Trafford Leigh Mallory, to erupt into a row which in the end cost him his command and Park his job in 11 Group.

Dowding was a quiet, reserved man, not an extrovert at all but he was so professional, so clearly devoted to the young pilots who flew in his command that he had their loyalty. The trouble in his command started when Keith Park got the job a year or two before the war began as head, that is Air Officer Commanding, of 11 Group. Park had a history as a fighter pilot. He had been decorated for his flying in the last part of the First World War. That was his trade, a tough New Zealander fighter pilot. Trafford Leigh Mallory was quite a different proposition. He had a brother who had died on Everest, reaching the top but dying on his way down. He was a very English man, part of the establishment and a very clubbable man. He had never been a fighter pilot, yet he was very much part of the RAF establishment. He was also ambitious. When Park was made AOC of 11 Group, Leigh Mallory felt put out. He would have liked the post himself. Yet he got 12 Group where he became AOC. He also didn’t really like Dowding who wasn’t his kind of man. Unfortunately, he let Park know. Park didn’t like that. He was a very loyal man. The trouble began as the Battle progressed. Park’s growing problem was having to expose his airfields to attack by sending off their squadrons to intercept the enemy in the south of England. He asked 12 Group, which was situated north of 11 Group and slightly to the north of London, to cover some of his airfields to prevent them being attacked. But it didn’t always happen. For instance, there was an incident when he had asked Leigh Mallory to cover Debden, whose squadrons had been sent south, to intercept the enemy. The help never arrived. Debden was left undefended against a very devastating raid by the Luftwaffe. Park was furious.

What next happened in this turn of events was the rise of Bader, the legless pilot who was CO of 242 Squadron. He conceived the idea of forming a wing of 3 squadrons, with him at the helm, leading them all. His idea was to hit the enemy in strength. In its way it was a great notion. RAF squadrons were always being outnumbered and this would cure that. The only trouble was that 11 Group seldom had the time to assemble squadrons into a wing. They had to intercept the enemy with little time to spare. That was if they wanted to hit the enemy before he had dropped his bombs. When Park did have time to assemble a wing, he did so.

The fact was that with 12 Group being situated north of London, it usually had much more time to form up a wing. What was possible for it just wasn’t on for 11 Group. Bader was fortunate to have had Leigh Mallory as his AOC. Mallory backed Bader and his tactics. The two formed a close partnership, in which each understood the other. The fact was Bader never really appreciated the “Dowding System” of defence which had grown out of the work of such men as Tizard and Watson Watt. Bader took the view that the only man who could take decisions in the air was the person up there flying and in charge. He didn’t like the idea of having to obey a controller on the ground telling him what to do. His heroes were the pilots of the First World War like Ball and McCudden. Added to all this was the fact that Bader was a tremendous leader and an immensely strong character who was used to having his own way. He was the product of an appalling accident which had led him to lose his legs in 1933 but had also seen him recover.

The next step in the saga was the chance that the adjutant of his squadron, Flight Lieutenant Peter McDonald also happened to be a sitting MP at the time. He picked up the story of Bader’s frustrations about not getting his own way at all times particularly on the subject of the big wing formation. On one of his visits to Parliament, he told the story to the Under Secretary State for Air, Balfour. Balfour passed it on to the Minister who in turn passed it on to Churchill. The fat was in the fire. Very soon the story was common knowledge in the higher reaches of the Air Ministry. The fuse was lit.

Statistical summary, Week 12:

* Total Fighter Command Establishment: 1662 planes
* Strength: 1581 planes
* Balance: understrength 81 planes
* Weekly losses: 46 Hurricanes (23 damaged), 32 Spitfires (24 damaged)
* Weekly Aircraft Production: 0 Beaufighters, 10 Defiants, 58 Hurricanes, 34 Spitfires

The most difficult part of the Battle, for Dowding and Park, was the problem posed by the growing shortage of pilots. Although, on the British side the RAF had the advantage of pilots who were shot down, often surviving to fight another day, there just weren’t enough trained, let alone experienced pilots, available to fill the gaps in the squadrons.

So the inevitable result was that the trainee pilots had their training cut short. Courses were shortened and drastically. The time the young pilot got on single seater fighter flying was, in particular, cut short. Training went from months to weeks. A young pilot would get posted to a squadron when he only had 5 to 10 hours flying experience on a Spitfire or Hurricane. A few, of course, were naturals who took to flying a fighter like duck to water. It was they who had a very strong survival instinct but most were still nervous if not downright frightened at this first experience of flying such a demanding airplane. The result was that when they got on the squadrons, what was asked of them far exceeded what they were capable of. They just weren’t up to the challenge however hard they might have tried.

The difficulty was that there was little the squadron itself could do about it. The experienced pilots were too much in demand to fill their operational time in the squadron for them to have the time let alone the patience to nurse the newcomers into coping with the day-to-day exposure involved in fighting the Luftwaffe. They might try but seldom did it succeed in prolonging the life of the novice.

Perhaps more should have been done to expose the trainees at the operational training units, the OTUs of Fighter Command, to pass on the experience of pilots from the squadrons to give a taste of what it was like to do the real fighting. Perhaps some system should have been organised whereby the experienced pilots on the squadrons should have been given a couple of days off in return for an hour or two with the trainee pilots for the purpose.

Keith Park, when he left 11 Group after the Battle was over and was posted to Commander of a group in Training Command, found in many respects the OTUs were out of touch with reality. It shocked him. He did his best to cope with the problem which, indeed, persisted well into the war.

Statistical summary, Week 11:

• Total Fighter Command Establishment: 1662 planes
• Strength: 1509 planes
• Balance: understrength 153 planes
• Losses: 12 Hurricanes, 7 Spitfires (+9 damaged), 7 unidentified to date
  
• Aircraft Production: 4 Beaufighters, 6 Defiants, 57 Hurricanes, 40 Spitfires

Having sung the praises of our continental allies of 1940, let us turn now to the many who came from the Dominions, in what was, in those days long past called the Empire. What the RAF had done before the war was send out a recruiting team to offer the young men of the day the chance to fly for the RAF, on short service commissions. It was a brilliant idea. The RAF managed to recruit over 200 volunteers this way, who became pilots. The RAF certainly got some star performers by casting its net so far and wide.

For instance, from New Zealand, its recruits included Alan Deere who managed more than half a dozen extraordinary hairy incidents and in the process became an outstanding ace. Then there was “Sailor” Malan from South Africa who got an amazing reputation as the best shot in Fighter Command. Both of these men were real leaders. “Sailor” Malan became an early CO of 54 Squadron.

It wasn’t just the capacity of these recruits from New Zealand, South Africa, Australia and Canada to fly and fight, they had real powers of leadership. They instilled confidence in other members of their squadrons. They didn’t want to add only to their number of kills, they minded about their compatriots and the reputation of their squadrons.

What complemented the eagerness of these young men from the Dominions, was what the RAF offered. It gave them the opportunity of flying. The Hurricane and the Spitfire were both British models of the front line fighter of the day. It was the single seater monoplane fighter, capable of 300 miles per hour plus, which became every schoolboy’s dream to fly. Coming of age, no wonder they wanted to grasp that opportunity. Furthermore, war was coming. They had all known that. They had heard from their parents what it had been like last time. Not for them a heroic death on the Somme. Not for them, all that stuff about King and Country. They were opting for a cleaner way to fight. One in which they could pit skill against skill. If you had to go, it was better to go this way than suffer all that mud and blood in the trenches. This is what attracted them.

303 squadron pilots. From the left side: Sgt. Stasik, P/O Socha, P/O Kolecki, F/O Lipiński, F/O Horbaczewski, F/O Schmidt, F/Sgt Giermar (on the wing), F/Lt Zumbach, S/Ldr Kołaczewski, F/Lt Żak, F/Sgt Popek, F/O Bieńkowski, F/O Kłosin, F/O Kolubiński, F/Sgt Karczmarz, F/Sgt Sochacki, F/Sgt Wojciechowski and on the propeller F/O Głowacki.

Statistical summary, Week 10:

• Total Fighter Command Establishment: 1662 planes
• Strength: 1492 planes
• Balance: understrength 170 planes
• Losses: 59 Hurricanes (+ 20 damaged), 28 Spitfires (+15 damaged)
  
• Aircraft Production: 6 Beaufighters, 10 Defiants, 56 Hurricanes, 38 Spitfires

It could be said that in the Battle of Britain the Poles played the part which Blucher had done for Wellington at Waterloo. Some might argue that this is an exaggeration but, the fact is, that when the Poles came into the Battle, Fighter Command’s effectiveness was being worn down by the loss of really experienced pilots. What the Poles represented was an infusion of exactly what was lacking, namely really experienced pilots. Not only were they fully trained, they also had a tremendously personal urge to get to grips with the enemy. The British pilots had the incentive of preventing the enemy winning because this would have delivered their country into Hitler’s hands. They could imagine what this might mean. But the Poles actually knew what this meant. They had experienced the Nazi takeover of their country. They wanted revenge.

What the Poles also had was an élan peculiar to them. They were proud to be Polish. In fact, they loved being Polish and they didn’t mind showing it. Moreover, they fitted into the RAF perfectly. There were no problems converting them to Spitfires and Hurricanes. They took to these new planes like a ballerina to her shoes. It was as if these two aircraft had been waiting for them to fly them. There was only one problem. The language. The Poles liked expressing themselves. In battle there was no holding them. The radio transmitters, the RT became crowded with what an RAF pilot called “Polish chatter”. Furthermore, they had to learn RAF procedure. But finally they got it. At the beginning of September pressure on Fighter Command was such that Dowding when pressed on the subject again quietly gave in. “Yes make them operational”.

303 Squadron became operational at Northolt just to the west of London. It’s where the Polish air force memorial stands, commemorating their participation in the Battle. 303 achieved an exceptional record in the Battle of Britain. It won the greatest success in the number of kills of any squadron in the whole Command. The number of kills was only exceeded by the number of hearts broken in the West End by those good looking guys.

But having praised the Poles, we must mention the Czechs. While the Poles fielded some 140 pilots in the RAF during the war, the Czechs put some 30 pilots at the RAF’s disposal. They too had a record similar to that of the Poles. They also were extremely successful and for fundamentally the same reasons. They were very professional and very well trained and had the experience.

After them came the French and Belgians. Small in number but eager in spirit.

It was an honour to have them all and we shall not forget them.